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Witness Name: Donald Scott Grey
Statement No: WITN0522
Exhibits: WITN0522_01/1 - WITN0522_01/9
Date: 11 October 2022
POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY
FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DONALD SCOTT GREY
I, DONALD SCOTT GREY, will say as follows:-
INTRODUCTION
a. Asa former lead manager in Post Office Limited I have been invited to
provide a witness statement to the inquiry pursuant to Rule 9 of the
inquiry Rules 2006.
b. These events all happened over 20 years ago and it is difficult to recall
precise details and specific events after that time without full access to all
working papers. This statement has been compiled from those papers I
have been given and my recollections and I have answered all questions
as fully and as honestly as I am able so long afterwards.
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PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
a. The Inquiry has asked me to set out briefly my professional background. I
joined the Post Office in January 1963 as an Executive Officer from school
and held various operational management appointments over the years in
computing, mails and counter services.
b. From 1986 until June 1993 I was District Manager for Post Office counter
services across 3 counties in the North Midlands.
c. In June 1993, on business reorganisation, I moved to Leeds and in 1997 I
became Regional General Manager for the North East Region with
responsibility for over 9000 people in 2800 post offices from Lincolnshire to
the Scottish Border.
d. On business reorganisation in Summer 1999 I undertook a project to improve
the efficiency of the branch office network.
e. In January 2000 I was appointed Horizon National Roll Out Project Manager
with responsibility for completing the roll-out of the Horizon IT project across
the nationwide network of post offices.
f. When the installation programme was largely complete in July 2001 I moved
to lead the Business Service Management function with responsibility for
providing operational support and supplies to the post office network.
g. I retired in March 2003.
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HORIZON BACKGROUND
. The Inquiry has asked me to set out the background to my involvement in the
Horizon project. The Horizon implementation programme began in 1997 with
a live trial at a small number of offices in the South West and North East. My
initial involvement was as Regional General Manager North East with
operational responsibility for trial offices in the North East, reviewing and
learning from the practical outcomes and issues from this trial in readiness
for national roll out. My prime responsibility was managing counter services;
the Horizon trial absorbed no more than 10% of my time.
. Learning and communication and support experiences were a key part of this
process. During the pilot the local implementation team and operational
managers were heavily involved in co-ordinating the activity on the ground
and identifying and handling practical, technical and support issues that
arose. These were shared with the national Horizon project team who
managed the broader picture and initiated required actions.
. In January 2000 I took up the role of National Roll Out Project Manager, a
post I held for the 18 months it took to complete the main rollout.
. When I moved to Business Service Management (BSM) in 2001 my Horizon
involvement was in an operational support role. This was very much a
business as usual role with the Horizon system being but one element of this.
I had no project responsibilities beyond keeping an eye on the completion of
the last stages of national roll out during my early months on the job.
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3. TECHNICAL ISSUES SUMMER/AUTUMN 1999
a. The Inquiry has asked me to set out my understanding about the technical
issues with Horizon in the Summer and Autumn of 1999. I have also been
asked to comment on my understanding of the reasons for the suspension of
the roll out and my knowledge of the ‘checks’ and ‘integrity controls’ that were
put in place to address these issues. Prior to my implementation role in
January 2000 my knowledge of technical issues was limited to what was
generally communicated to operational managers either in discussion or
documents such as the Inquiry has made available to me, namely the emails
on the Horizon acceptance update (WITN0522_01/1 - POL00028463 Email
from Keith Hardie, Head of PR & External Communications at POCL to
POCL employees re Horizon Acceptance Update) and notes of the Special
Delivery meeting of 14 January 2000 (WITN0522_01/2 - POL00028509
Horizon/Pathway Delivery Meeting: Special Meeting Notes, 14 Jan 2000,
sent by Dick Brazear, Head of Programme Office for Post Office Network to
POCL and ICL employees) . At operational level the most evident issues
during the trial were periodic system freezes and printer failures which
impacted on customer service and user confidence. The responsibility of
myself and my local team during the trial was to identify and feedback
experiences and issues from a user perspective. We were not involved in
the technical assessment of any issues.
b. My understanding was that national rollout could not proceed until both a
commercial agreement had been concluded with the Benefits Agency, and
the Horizon system had been accepted from ICL. This latter requirement
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depended, at least in part, on the resolution of issues defined in POCL
Acceptance and Business Impact Assessment (WITN0522_01/3 -
POL00030393 Electronic memorandum by the Post Office on acceptance
and business impact).
c. As data integrity controls and checks were essentially national issues I had
no direct involvement in these. My knowledge of these was limited to the
general updates I was given from the project team such as in document
WITN0522_01/3 - POL00030393.
4. HORIZON RESEARCH REPORT
a. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on my knowledge of the Horizon
Research Report including by whom and for what reason it was
commissioned. I have also been asked to comment on my understanding of
end users concerns with the provision of training, their concerns with
balancing accounts of Horizon, their concerns with provision of advice and
assistance and what action was being taken to address their concerns. A
report (WITN0522_01/4 - NFSP00000261 Circulation: National Executive
Council, NFSP, enclosing:
i. letter from David Smith to Colin Baker, 31 Jan 2000;
ii. I PO Consulting "Christmas Horizon Research Report", Jan 2000)
was commissioned from the Post Office Consulting Research Services
before I joined the project and I do not know who did so. The purpose of the
report was to ask over 300 staff and subpostmasters who had taken part in
Horizon roll out during its pilot phase in Autumn 1999 about their
experiences and feedback.. On commencing my role on the implementation
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team in January 2000 I was made aware of its contents. This feedback was
an essential part of learning about the impact of implementation. During my
early days on the project it was a useful reference. Not only to provide a
benchmark but to help identify improvement opportunities going forward.
b. Though over 90% of respondents found the system easier to use once they
had adapted to it only half felt the training was good. The reasons given for
dissatisfaction were mainly around the sufficiency of training, including on
balancing.
c. As this was a new automation system, not an upgraded one, it was no
surprise that the training feedback was mixed. Some colleagues were not IT
literate and the training had to encompass a wide range of abilities and
backgrounds with an age range that stretched from those recently left school
to octogenarians. The training was never intended to be exhaustive but
sufficient to provide the essential operating skills to be supplemented by
practical experience on the job in a familiar environment with on-site
guidance. As a result of this feedback additional support was provided during
the early days on the new system.
. Nearly half of respondents found balancing more difficult largely because it
was quite different to existing manual procedures and more time consuming,
at least in the early weeks. With any major business change, however well it
is planned and implemented, there will be a learning curve and teething
problems as people adjust to the new system. A first-time automation project
of this magnitude was no exception. Those who had been used to manual
accounting procedures would need time to adjust to the new way of working,
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especially as the established methods they had used previously to verify
transactions may no longer be available to them. Horizon Field Support
Officers who supported post offices in the early days after they moved on to
the Horizon system were equipped to provide hands-on assistance on
recommended practices to help subpostmasters and staff develop best
practices. After the live trial in 1999 strengthening the support given to
outlets in their early days on Horizon, including initial balances, resulted in a
noticeable improvement as my letter to the NFSP General Secretary
(WITN0522_01/5 - NFSP00000348 Letter from Don Grey (POL) to Colin
Baker) records.
e. Though there may have been some initial confusion about which helpdesk to
call, this quickly settled down and was not seen to be a major issue. The
quality of response at each helpdesk may have been slower at the outset as
staff acquired essential experience and call scripts were refined but this too
soon settled down. There was also some dissatisfaction amongst users when
passed to another call handler if the enquiry required more specialist advice.
The time to answer and the quality of responses was regularly monitored and
improvements made where required.
f. All post offices were issued with a practical user handbook, the Horizon Guide,
to explain in some detail Horizon operations and assist their move to the new
system. This was a comprehensive, hard copy, step-by-step handbook which
described key processes and transactional information including balancing.
Just over half (55%) of users found this guide useful but around one in four
had not made much use of it. Some preferred to rely on a helpdesk instead.
Creating a comprehensive, easy to use reference document to satisfy the
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needs varying between those well versed in IT and new learners was no easy
task. The content was informed by learning and experience to try and find the
right balance with updates as appropriate.
g. This was a major new undertaking and a learning process for all involved.
Feedback from users and support staff was essential to success and actively
encouraged throughout the business. Besides the research report
(WITNO522_01/4 - NFSP00000261) feedback was collected via helpdesk
calls, visits to outlets, frequent dialogue with operational colleagues,
subpostmasters and staff, in person and through user groups, and their
representatives Every opportunity was taken at all levels, including by the
POCL Directors to obtain front line comments. The regular analysis of
helpdesk calls enabled us to identify frequent and emerging issues which were
passed to specialists in BSM to analyse root causes and seek solutions.
Issues and opportunities were processed and tracked to resolution within the
business change process and were also reported upwards both in monthly
management reports and progress tracked in team meetings. Documents
WITN0522_01/4 - NFSP00000261, WITN0522_01/5 - NFSP00000348 and my
letter to the NFSP General Secretary of 5 October 2000 (WITN0522_01/6 -
NFSP 00000289 Letter from Don Grey, Horizon National Roll Out Project
Manager to Colin Baker, General Secretary of the NFSP) all provide examples
of how issues led to improvements.
5. NATIONAL ROLL OUT PROJECT MANAGER ROLE
a. The Inquiry has asked me to provide details of my role as National Roll Out
Project Manager. The primary responsibility of this role was the planning and
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implementation of the training of counter staff and installation of Horizon as an
Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) computer system at all post offices in the UK.
I was asked to undertake this role based on my extensive operational
experience and track record for delivering results as this was deemed a more
essential requirement than previous major project experience. I reported to the
Automation Director, who also led other teams overseeing other aspects of the
Horizon automation programme, such as system integrity and contract
management.
In addition to a central project team in London my team operated from regional
centres in Glasgow, Leeds, Bristol, and St Albans. They directed local teams
in the field to provide appropriate support to post offices across the network. At
its peak over 350 people were engaged in undertaking implementation front-
line support work.
I spent time each week visiting field teams and post offices with local
colleagues to see how things were working on the ground and to obtain first-
hand feedback. I also undertook the basic training to experience what staff
and subpostmasters had to cope with and satisfy myself that it was fit for
purpose.
The Inquiry has also asked me to comment on my understanding of the losses
referenced in my letter of 1 February 2000 to the NFSP General Secretary
(WITN0522_01/5 - NFSP00000348) including why these matters were raised
with me and what enquires and actions were taken as a result. However, I am
unable to add anything to that which is recorded in this letter. The General
Secretary of the NFSP must have raised these concerns with me but I have no
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means of identifying currently what action I took or the outcome. Initial
investigation by a member of my team seems to have eliminated Horizon
migration issues as a cause and identified that significant misbalance history
existed before the offices migrated to Horizon though there is nothing in the
document to indicate why. The reference to misbalances is merely mentioning
a pre-Horizon situation which is proper to be dealt with by the Finance
Department in Chesterfield and not the Horizon project team. I feel sure that
neither I nor the NFSP would have let this matter go unaddressed.
This instance does, however, demonstrate the regular and open dialogue
that existed between us to discuss issues and concerns as they were
identified. I had direct and positive dealings with subpostmasters and staff at
all levels over many years and, as WITNO522_01/4 - NFSP00000261 attests, I
am a listener who responds in a spirit of co-operation and continuous
improvement.
OFFICE DISCREPANCY
. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on my understanding of the losses
reported at the Waterloo Road Post Office Branch. I have also been asked to
comment on why these matters were raised with me, what enquires and
actions I took, what my understanding was at this time in relations to faults in
the Horizon system and their effects and whether this was reported to
subpostmasters and end users of the Horizon system. I have no recollection
of this specific incident at Waterloo Road (WITN0522_01/7 - NFSP00000287
Email from Mike Ingle (Post Office Network) to Don Grey Horizon Roll Out
Project Manager). From the document it would seem the cause of the
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unresolved problem at this office appears to have been a discrepancy in the
daily totalling of TV Licences within the Horizon system. This seems to have
been picked up by our Finance department who issued an error notice to
correct the problem at office level. As I cannot recall this event I am unable to
say so long afterwards if a system error was responsible.
. It is probable that this issue was raised with me because I encouraged all
operational staff I met to flag up any system concerns - Mike Ingle was one of
my previous team in the North East. The proper route for addressing system
issues at offices which had gone live was via Business Service Management
(BSM ) but during the early days I was happy being appraised directly of any
issues because of any potential impact on rollout.
. If a system error was suspected the normal procedure would be for the
Finance Dept. to escalate it via BSM for further investigation. When I received
any separate communication about any issue I would normally ask one of my
team to ensure the incident had been properly logged for investigation and
resolution. Hitches in new IT systems are not uncommon and are usually
resolved expeditiously without fundamental harm to users or system integrity.
. I was not made aware of all issues but on the information available to me at no
time during my time on Horizon did I believe that there were systems or other
major faults. Should I have done so during roll out I would have
recommended a pause until they had been rectified.
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e. The detailed checks in the Finance Dept. in Chesterfield, which have existed
over many decades, are designed to pick up discrepancies in office accounts
between amounts claimed in the weekly Cash Account and supporting
documentation. Discrepancies are usually identified and resolved, as it was in
this case, by the issue of an error notice to the office to correct the problem.
There was a requirement for specific concerns about any potential system
problem to be flagged up with relevant evidence for further investigation and
remedy and so far as I am aware this approach was followed during Horizon
roll out.
f. There existed an established and comprehensive process in which reported
issues, including feedback from all stakeholders and helpdesks, were
recorded, collated and addressed throughout roll out and beyond. When
issues were confirmed they were managed in a structured way through the
business change control process and appropriately resolved. Periodic system
upgrades incorporated significant enhancements and others including alerts
were communicated by a brief service message on the system or notices to
outlets in official publications such as the Counter News which was issued
weekly.
CSR+ SOFTWARE RELEASE
a. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on the nature of the ‘outstanding faults’
and/or ‘software problems identified in relation to CSR+ and what action I
understood ICL Pathway had taken in relation to these problems. This
software release was about introducing new functionality as well as improving
system performance. Service improvement ideas emanating from user groups
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had also been incorporated into this software release, such as reducing the
rollover time when moving from one accounting period to another. Software
development was not within my remit and I was not involved in the planning
and content of software releases. My role was to engage in introducing the
final product to offices in a controlled way with appropriate training ((e.g. my
letter to outlets on new procedures (WITN0522_01/8 - NFSP00000318 Letter
from Don Grey, Horizon National Roll Out Project Manager to SPMs) when it
had been approved and was fit for rollout.
. The only problem I can now recall related to the preservation of data when
swapping out faulty kit at some multi-position counters. My understanding was
that this was an intermittent problem which did not compromise outlet or
business data integrity but needed to be fixed before the new CSR+ software
was released. After the start of the pilot had been postponed by a few weeks
we received assurances from ICL that this problem had been fixed and the
upgrade could proceed.
TRAINING
. The Inquiry has asked me to describe the training provided to end users of the
Horizon system prior to the CSR+ software release, who was reasonable for
devising the training package and what input was obtained from end users in
the preparation for this training. The training framework for new users was
much the same before and after CSR+ release. Firstly, all users were given
the opportunity to attend a local awareness event in the weeks before their
migration to Horizon. These were normally held in an evening after offices
closed in a suitable local location and lasted two hours or so to introduce
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colleagues to the nature of the Horizon system. These were voluntary
sessions but all colleagues were encouraged to attend. A few days before
the go-live date for each office the staff attended a basic classroom course
using off-line Horizon terminals for 1 day which concentrated on the point of
sale functions. Training was undertaken at a local venue in small groups of
around 10 people by a training specialist, Knowledge Pool, engaged by ICL to
deliver the training. As far as humanly possible every effort was made to
ensure consistent and quality training was given at each session.
. Branch managers and subpostmasters attended for a second day to learn
about stock control and financial accounting.
. The duration of each course was selected as a pragmatic balance between
essential training needs and time away from customer service. The initial
training was never intended to be exhaustive but sufficient to provide the
essential operating skills. These would be supplemented by practical
experience on the job in a familiar environment with on-site guidance from
experienced Horizon Field Support Officers over a few days and ongoing
support from local Retail Network Managers.
. The Post Office was committed to getting all staff and subpostmasters and
assistants sufficiently trained to operate the system. Over 64000 people were
trained during an 18 month period. At the peak of roll out staff at 300 post
offices a week were being trained. The Horizon Achievement Certificate was
awarded for successful completion of the appropriate course. Remedial
events were arranged for those who in the opinion of the trainer did not meet
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the required standard during initial training. A trainer quality review process
was also in place.
. On the resignation of a subpostmaster after the Horizon system had been
installed in an office the training of the incoming subpostmaster on Horizon
was incorporated into the initial on-site training given to all newly appointed
subpostmasters. This was normally for one week.
Where there was a major change of procedure such as happened with the
new CSR¢+ software release (WITN0522_01/8 - NFSP00000318) suitable
briefing material or workbooks were issued to outlets in advance of the
change to prepare for it.
. Although it was before my time on the project I believe the training
package had been jointly designed with ICL. I understand that a detailed
training needs analysis was undertaken between September 1996 and March
1997 and a training specialist, Knowledge Pool, was engaged to deliver the
training. They inspected potential training venues, often hotels, across the
country and selected suitable locations which sought to keep the travelling
distance from an office to no more than 15 miles. Knowledge Pool admin staff
arranged training placements, handled queries and changes and organised
pass certificates for those who successfully completed training.
. The training system was built around the needs of potential users as identified
in the initial training needs analysis. Feedback was collected at each training
session and where appropriate was incorporated into future events. As a first
time automation system the training had to encompass a wide range of ages,
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abilities and backgrounds. Many trainees had no previous experience of IT
so needed to be taught some basics. Training was not a “one size fits all”
event and was tailored as far as reasonably possible to the roles and needs of
individuals, including specialists like auditors.
9 HELPDESK
a. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on how helpdesk performance was
assessed by POCL during the Horizon roll out and what steps were taken to
improve performance and how this was monitored. There were a variety of
key performance statistics for both helpdesks. Those at the Horizon System
Helpdesk (HSH) were governed by a service level agreement with ICL.
Those for the Network Business Support Centre (NBSC) were incorporated
into a service level agreement with Post Office Customer Management who
were contracted to provide an initial call handling function. Performance
measures included time to answer (% calls answered within 20 secs),
duration of call, number of calls passed to another team for specialist
response, types of call, comparisons with previous regional Helplines
performance etc. These were permanent performance measures not just for
rollout but beyond. Call handler scripts at each helpdesk were updated to
ensure responses kept pace with transactional and other changes and to
incorporate improvements when identified.
b. Regular liaison with both ICL and PO Customer Management ensured that
day-to-day situations were tracked and appropriate remedial work initiated to
respond to any emerging situation. Performance review meetings between
the organisations involved were also held at different levels and frequencies
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to ensure compliance with requirements. Any issues that could not be
resolved at working level were escalated to a higher level for resolution.
c. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on the concerns identified in/around
October 2000 concerning ICL Pathway’s performance against service level
agreements, what I understand in regard to non-polling transactions and
what I believed the underlying causes to be. My recollection is that the ICL
problems in October 2000 were largely about the time to answer calls which
had fallen below the standard specified, especially on the busy days when
weekly office accounts were being prepared. This had been compounded by
ICL being unable to collect transactional information from some outlets.
d. Transactions were not completed in real-time and were harvested at the end
of each working day by the ICL server when the outlet was closed. This
process was triggered by ICL but required the outlet to have left the Horizon
system powered on. Even if the collection of transactions could not be
completed on any day we were assured by ICL that there would be no
compromise to data integrity.
e. Initially a frequent cause of the non-polling of transactions was a post office
not leaving their system powered on at close of business meaning the ICL
server could not collect the transactional data. Sometimes polling had been
attempted by ICL but could not be completed because of faults in the public
network communications system to the outlet.
The Inquiry has also asked me to comment on my understanding of what was
causing the errors in Horizon cash accounts describing what I understood to
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be the ‘root causes’ of these errors, remedial actions taken and service
improvements made as a result of feedback from end users. Without access
to working documents not now available to me I cannot elaborate on the
causes of errors in cash accounts, the remedial actions taken to address them
or the service improvements suggested by users. There was a structured and
comprehensive process on each helpdesk for identifying and managing issues
such as these. We also encouraged and listened to feedback from users via
other routes, such as outlet visits and user groups, and took on board that
which would enhance the performance and acceptability of the Horizon
system.
g. The Inquiry has asked me to explain the purpose, function and composition of
the ‘User Groups.’ User groups were essentially small informal focus groups
of subpostmasters and branch office staff designed to capture feedback from
users and test ideas on them with the aim of identifying system improvements.
Invitations to a local group held after hours were issued to those who had
been on the Horizon system for at least 3 months and had had time to settle in
to the new way of working. The agenda for these meetings was compiled
from the user responses to questionnaires sent out with the invitation to attend
and ideas received by Business Service Management often through the NBSC.
helpdesk. Each group was led by a senior manager in BSM and lasted 2-3
hours. They were held around every 3 months in different locations
nationwide. They were an inherent part of our listening strategy to secure
service improvements for the benefit of all users.
10. BUSINESS SERVICE MANAGEMENT
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a. The Inquiry has asked me to explain what was involved in my role as Head of
Business Service Management. The Head of Business Service Management
had overall responsibility for managing operational support to as well as
supplying all post offices across the network with cash, transactional stock
and stores (stationery etc.). This included oversight of the NBSC, and
relationship and supplier management of other internal partners such as
Stores, Cashco, and Customer Management. Liaison with ICL, or Fujitsu
Services as it had then become, within BSM at this stage was largely at
working level. Except for keeping an eye on the remnants of the national roll
out my Horizon project work ceased on this appointment. My involvement
with Horizon was then in a business as usual mode and included the
continuation of links with outlets, through visits and user groups, and the
NFSP on support issues.
b. The Inquiry has asked me to explain the purpose of the sub-committee
mentioned in para 5 of NFSP Executive Meeting report (WITN0522_01/9 -
NFSP00000501 NFSP report of the meeting of the National Executive
Council held on 30th & 31st July 2001). The sub-committee relates to an
NFSP group they would appoint to meet with key managers in BSM 3 or 4
times a year to discuss operational issues on Horizon. It provided an
opportunity for key NFSP players to discuss concerns, ensure BSM was alert
to user requirements and was progressing the resolution of issues. My
recollection is that we did not have too many of these meetings before they
dried up through non-attendance by NFSP reps, seemingly because the
effectiveness of business support processes and other regular
communications between us rendered them unnecessary.
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c. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on my understanding of ‘major
Horizon issues’ which is referenced in the report. The “major Horizon issues”
is NFSP secretarial terminology to cover all ongoing implementation issues.
So far as I was aware, there were no major issues and none that were not on
our radar being managed to resolution through business as usual processes.
Later this document (WITN0522_01/9 - NFSP00000501) records how the
NFSP “were extremely impressed” with the NBSC and that “it was working
extremely hard to reach its objectives”. As with outlets it took time for all non-
outlet staff, such as those in NBSC, to acquire expertise in the new system.
There was during my tenure a continually evolving situation to improve
system resilience and to prepare for forthcoming transactional changes, not
least of which was the introduction of universal network banking. This project
was to introduce system and process changes to enable banking
transactions for most commercial banks to be handled at PO counters.
d. The Inquiry has asked me to provide steps that were taken to resolve issues.
All reported issues were recorded and analysed. Where frequent or
significant the issue was passed to a team of specialists in BSM for further
action and follow up. On these issues root cause analysis was undertaken
and an appropriate resolution path identified. Where warranted alerts were
communicated to outlets via a service message on the system or in the
weekly bulletin and more significant improvements handled through the
business change control process and incorporated into future software
updates.
e. The Inquiry has asked me to provide my understanding of issues in relation
to impounded books. From the report to the NFSP National Executive
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meeting on 30/31 July 2001 (WITN0522_01/9 - NFSP00000501) it seems
that the Benefits Agency were unhappy that some notifications to the Horizon
system had not resulted in the impounding of some benefit books to stop
further payments being made. This may have happened because the
Benefits Agency was late in notifying us but I am unable to say after so many
years what was the precise cause.
. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on changes that were being made
within the NBSC at this time and the reason for these changes. There was
an ongoing programme to strengthen NBSC procedures and provide more
extensive training of call handlers to increase their skill sets and flexibility to
be able to respond better to fluctuating demands. Side-by-side with this work
was a continual refinement of call scripts to be more efficient and helpful to
outlet staff. There was also an extensive team preparing for the introduction
of the universal banking product across the network which was another major
change with an impact right across the business.
. The reason for these changes was twofold. Firstly, a desire for continuous
improvement and, secondly, readiness for a major business change.
BUGS, ERRORS & DEFECTS
. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on what I understood about bugs,
errors and defects in Horizon during my tenure as Horizon National Roll Out
Project Manager and Head of Business Service Management. No project of
this size and nature can escape without some issues and remedial work. So
far as I am aware, quality was never sacrificed for speed and as they arose
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relevant issues were recorded, collated and appropriately resolved... The
number and nature of bugs, errors and defects was never unmanageable.
Inevitably some (e.g. the time to rollover between account periods) attracted
more user noise than others but all were given proper and serious attention
as part of a comprehensive improvement process. After so long since my
time on the project and in BSM I cannot recall the nature and number of
bugs, errors and defects identified but my abiding memory is one of an
improving not worsening position.
ROBUSTNESS OF SYSTEM
. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on whether I considered Horizon to be
a robust IT system at this time. After national rollout began I cannot recall
any serious discussion in which genuine doubts were expressed about the
fundamental unreliability of the Horizon system or major flaws within it. Had
this been so during implementation I would have recommended a
suspension until the problem had been fixed. As with any major change it
took time for users to adjust to the new system but, throughout, my
experience was one of a caring, industrious and professional multi-discipline
team seeking to make a success of this project. There were teething
problems and some concerns but no alarm bells or red flags to indicate that a
major system weakness or jeopardy to data integrity existed.
During my time on the project and in BSM I was not aware of any undue
concern about the level of office misbalances. These situations had been a
fact of life in the manual balancing era and in serious cases the contract of a
subpostmaster would be terminated. The reported instances after Horizon
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13.
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rollout commenced did not amount to a significantly changed pattern. Indeed,
later user research in autumn 2000 mentioned at page 4 of my letter to the
NFSP General Secretary on 5 October (WITN0522_01/6 - NFSP00000289)
provides evidence of an improved feel good factor, including balancing,
amongst users.
ERROR REPORTING
. The Inquiry has asked me to comment on whether I consider that known
bugs, errors and defects in Horizon where properly reported by the Post
Office to end users of the system during the national roll out and early years
of operation. The Horizon system was a major business change and
involved learning new practices and procedures at all levels in the business.
During my time with the project there was never any attempt that I am aware
of to suppress problems or bad news. There was an open business culture
in which everyone, especially users, were actively encouraged to report
defects of any kind. During the previous decade POCL had invested much
time and effort into a total quality and putting customers first approach and
this was very much ingrained in business practice.
. It was, in my experience, the custom and practice of the Post Office to
resolve problems expeditiously and economically. The scale, importance and
potential impact on business integrity and reputation of this change made
this even more crucial in the early days of Horizon. With end users we tried
to strike the right balance in effective communication. The consensus view
from subpostmasters was that they wanted fewer and simpler messages so
every effort was made to keep communication to what was appropriate and
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necessary but there was never in my experience any attempt to withhold
information or conceal issues from users. Open and timely communication
happened when there was anything that should be shared, usually in the
established weekly service bulletin to offices.
14. CONCLUSION
It is regretful that the sad events that have happened after Horizon roll out
and which led to this inquiry have caused so much distress and scarred the
lives of people who have served the Post Office and their communities well.
This has left a permanent stain not only on the business but on what, at the
time, was a great collective achievement.
15. STATEMENT OF TRUTH
a. I believe the content of this statement to be true.
Dated: _11 October 2022
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Index to First Witness Statement of Donald Scott Grey
WITNO05220100
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No.
Exhibit
Number
Document Description
Control
Number
URN
WITNO522_01/1
Email from Keith Hardie,
Head of PR & External
Communications at POCL
to POCL employees re
Horizon Acceptance
Update
POL-
0024945
POL00028463
WITNO0522_01/2
Horizon/Pathway Delivery
Meeting: Special Meeting
Notes, 14 Jan 2000, sent
by Dick Brazear, Head of
Programme Office for Post
Office Network to POCL
and ICL employees
POL-
0024991
POL00028509
WITNO0522_01/3
Electronic memorandum by
the Post Office on
acceptance and business
impact.
POL-
0026875
POL00030393
WITNO0522_01/4
Circulation: National
Executive Council, NFSP,
enclosing: i) letter from
David Smith to Colin Baker,
31 Jan 2000; ii) PO
Consulting "Christmas
VIS00008709
NFSP00000261
Page 25 of 26
WITNO05220100
WITN05220100
Horizon Research Report",
Jan 2000,
WITNO0522_01/5
Letter from Don Grey (POL)
to Colin Baker
VIS00008796
NFSP00000348
WITN0522_01/6
Letter from Don Grey,
Horizon National Roll Out
Project Manager to Colin
Baker, General Secretary
of the NFSP
VIS00008737
NFSP00000289
WITNO0522_01/7
Email from Mike Ingle (Post
Office Network) to Don
Grey Horizon Roll Out
Project Manager
VIS00008735
NFSP00000287
WITNO0522_01/8
Letter from Don Grey,
Horizon National Roll Out
Project Manager to SPMs
VIS00008766
NFSP00000318
WITNO0522_01/9
NFSP report of the meeting
of the National Executive
Council held on 30th & 31st
July 2001
VIS00008959
NFSP00000501
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